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1 We take rankings of (that is, preferences over) the outcomes as primitives (and utility functions merely as tools for representing those rankings). Thus we are not following the revealed preference approach, where observed choices are the primitives and preferences (or utility) are a derived notion:
"In revealed-preference theory, it isn't true [...] that Pandora chooses b rather than a because she prefers b to a. On the contrary, it is because Pandora chooses b rather than a that we say that Pandora prefers b to a, and assign b a larger utility." (Binmore, 2011, p. 19 .) Thus in the Prisoner's Dilemma game of Part b of Figure 1 , "Writing a larger payoff for Player 1 in the bottom-left cell of the payoff table than in the top-left cell is just another way of registering that Player 1 would choose D if she knew that Player 2 were going to choose c. [W] e must remember that Player 1 doesn't choose D because she then gets a larger payoff. Player 1 assigns a larger payoff to [the outcome associated with] (D,c) than to [the outcome associated with] (C,c) because she would choose the former if given the choice." (Binmore, 2011, pp. 27-28 , with minor modifications to adapt the quotation to the notation used in Figure 1 .) For a criticism of (various interpretations of) the notion of revealed preference see Chapter 3 of Hausman, 2012 ; see also Rubinstein and Salant, 2008. 
A choice is rational if it is optimal given the decision-maker's preferences and beliefs. (BDR)
More precisely, we say that it is rational for the decision-maker to choose action a if there is no other feasible action b which − according to her beliefs − would yield an outcome that she prefers to the outcome that − again, according to her beliefs − would be a consequence of taking action a.
According to this definition, the followers of Harold Camping did act rationally when they decided to sell everything and devote themselves to promoting Camping's claim: they believed that the world was soon coming to an end and − presumably − they viewed their proselytizing as "qualifying them for Rapture", undoubtedly an outcome they preferred to the alternative of enduring the wrath of Judgment Day. Similarly, Ann's decision to live it up in anticipation of the end of the world predicted by the Mayan calendar qualifies as rational, as does Bob's decision to carry on smoking on the belief that − like his grandfather − he will be immune from cancer. Thus anybody who argues that the above decisions are not rational must be appealing to a stronger definition of rationality than BDR: for example, one could question the rationality of holding those beliefs.
When the rationality of beliefs is called into question, an asymmetry is introduced between preferences and beliefs. Concerning preferences it is a generally accepted principle that de gustibus non est disputandum (in matters of taste, there can be no disputes). According to this principle, there is no such thing as an irrational preference. As Rubinstein notes, "According to the assumption of rationality in economics, the decision maker is guided by his preferences. But the assumption does not impose a limitation on the reasonableness of preferences. The preferences can be even in direct contrast with what common sense might define as the decision maker's interests." (Rubinstein, 2012, p. 49.) For example, I cannot be judged to be irrational if I prefer an immediate benefit (e.g. from taking a drug) with known negative future consequences (e.g. from addiction) over an immediate sacrifice (e.g. by enduring pain) followed by better long-term health.
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In the matter of beliefs, on the other hand, it is generally thought that one can contend that some particular beliefs are "unreasonable" or "irrational", by appealing to such arguments as the lack of supporting evidence, the incorrect processing of relevant information, the denial of laws of Nature, etc.
Consider now the following statement by Player 1 in the Prisoner's Dilemma ('COR' stands for 'correlation'):
"I believe that if I play C then Player 2 will play c and that if I play D then Player 2 will play d. Hence, if I play C then the outcome will be 1 z and if I play D then the outcome will be 4 z . Since I prefer 1 z to 4 z , I have decided to play C."
Given the reported beliefs, Player 1's decision to play C is rational according to definition BDR.
Thus in order to question the rationality of Player 1's decision, one has to argue that the beliefs expressed in COR 1 violate some principle of rationality. In the literature, there are those who claim that Player 1's reported beliefs are irrational and those who claim that those beliefs can be rationally justified, for example by appealing to the symmetry of the game (see, for example, Brams, 1975 , and Davis, 1977 , 1985 or to special circumstances, such as the players being identical in some sense (e.g. they are identical twins): this has become known as the "Identicality Assumption" (see Green, 1999, and Gilboa, 1999) .
In order to elucidate what is involved in Player 1's belief "if I play C then Player 2 will play c, and if I play D then Player 2 will d " we broaden the discussion to the more general issue of the role of beliefs and conditionals in game-theoretic reasoning.
Models of games: beliefs and choices
It is a widely held opinion that the notion of rationality involves the use of counterfactual reasoning. For example, Aumann writes: (Aumann, 1995, p. 15.) How is counterfactual reasoning incorporated in the analysis of games? σ ω = ∈ then the usual interpretation is that at state ω player i "chooses" strategy x. The exact meaning of 'choosing' is not elaborated further in the literature: does it mean that player i has actually played x or that she is committed to playing x or that x is the output of her deliberation process?
We will adopt the latter interpretation: 'player i chooses x' will be taken to mean 'player i has made up her mind to play x'.
Part a of Figure 2 shows a strategic-form game in reduced form and Part b a model of it.
We represent the relation i B graphically as follows: 
Figure 2 
Ω → B
; such functions are called possibility correspondences in the literature. For further details on the so called "epistemic foundation program" in game theory, the reader is referred to Battigalli and Bonanno, 1999. Player 2 has made up his mind to play C ( 1 ( ) { } It should be noted, however, that a large literature − that originates in Aumann, 1987 − develops the analysis of rationality in strategic-form games using the models described above, without enriching them with an explicit framework for counterfactuals. However, as Shin (1992, p. 412) notes "If counterfactuals are not explicitly invoked, it is because the assumptions are buried implicitly in the discussion." We shall return to this point in Section 4.
Stalnaker-Lewis selection functions
There are different types of conditionals. A conditional of the form "If John received my message he will be here soon" is called an indicative conditional. Conditionals of the form "If I were to drop this vase, it would break" and "If we had not missed the connection, we would be at home now" are called subjunctive conditionals; the latter is also an example of a counterfactual, namely a conditional with a false antecedent (we did in fact miss the connection). It is controversial how best to classify conditionals and we will not address this issue here. We are interested in the use of conditionals in the analysis of games and thus the relevant conditionals are those that pertain to deliberation.
In the decision-theoretic and game-theoretic literature the conditionals involved in deliberation are usually called "counterfactuals", as illustrated in the quotation from Aumann (1995) in Section 2 and in the following:
"[R]ational decision-making involves conditional propositions: when a person weighs a major decision, it is rational for him to ask, for each act he considers, what would happen if he performed that act. It is rational, then, for him to consider propositions of the form 'If I were to do a, then c would happen'. Such a proposition we shall call a counterfactual." (Gibbard and Harper, 1978, p. 153.) With the exception of Shin (1992) , Bicchieri and Green (1999) , Zambrano (2004) and Board (2006) (whose contributions are discussed in Section 4), the issue of counterfactual reasoning in strategic-form games has not been dealt with explicitly in the literature.
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We denote by φ ψ > the conditional "if φ were the case then ψ would be the case". In the Stalnaker-Lewis theory of conditionals (Stalnaker, 1968 , Lewis, 1973 The semantic representation of conditionals is done by means of a selection function
Ω denotes the set of subsets of Ω ) that associates with every state ω and subset E ⊆ Ω (representing a proposition) a subset ( , ) f E E ω ⊆ interpreted as the states in E that are closest to ω . Several restrictions are imposed on the selection function, but we will skip the details. 5 Although the issue has been discussed extensively in the context of dynamic games. See Bonanno (2013a) for a general discussion and relevant references. 6 For example, the restriction that if
Just as the notion of accessibility relation enables us to represent a player's beliefs The issue of determining what state(s) ought to be deemed closest to a given state is not a straightforward one. Usually "closeness" is interpreted in terms of a ceteris paribus (other things being equal) condition. However, typically some background conditions must be changed in order to evaluate a counterfactual. Consider, for example, the situation represented by state β in the model of Figure 2 . What would be − in an appropriately enriched model − the closest state to β , call it η , where Player 1 plays B rather than A ? It has been argued (we will return to this point later) that it ought to be postulated that η is a state where Player 1 has the same beliefs about Player 2's choice as in state β . But, if − given Player 1's beliefs at β − the choice of A is rational, then at η one of the background conditions that describe state β no longer holds, namely, that Player 1 is rational and knows that she is rational. Alternatively, if one wants to hold this condition constant, then one must postulate that at η Player 1 believes that Player 2 is playing D and thus one must change another background condition at β , namely her beliefs about Player 2. We will return to these issue in Section 4.
There is also another issue that needs to be addressed. The selection function f is usually interpreted as capturing the notion of "causality" or "objective counterfactuality". For example, suppose that Ann is facing two faucets, one labeled 'hot' and the other 'cold', and she needs hot water. Suppose also that the faucets are mislabeled and Ann is unaware of this. Then it would be objectively or causally true that "if Ann turned on the faucet labeled 'cold' she would get hot water"; however, she could not be judged to be irrational if she expressed the belief "if I turned on the faucet labeled 'cold' I would get cold water" (and acted on this belief by turning on the faucet labeled 'hot' 
Subjective counterfactuals as dispositional belief revision
One construal of subjective counterfactuals is in terms of a subjective selection function have not been used in the analysis of strategic-form games, with the exception of Shin (1992) and Zambrano (2004) , whose contributions are discussed in Section 4.
In this context, an enriched model of a strategic-form game G is a quadruple 
For a more detailed discussion see Bonanno (2013a) .
imply a belief by Player 1 that her "switching" from C to D causes Player 2 to change her decision from c to d, while such a causal effect is ruled out by the fact that each player is making her choice in ignorance of the choice made by the other player (the choices are made "simultaneously"). For example, Harper (1988, p. 25) claims that "a causal independence assumption is part of the idealization built into the normal form" and Stalnaker (1996, p. 138) writes "[I]n a strategic form game, the assumption is that the strategies are chosen independently, which means that the choices made by one player cannot influence the beliefs or the actions of the other players". One can express this point of view as follows ('IND' stands for 'independence'):
In an enriched model of a game, if at state ω player i is rational and chooses strategy x and considers it possible that his opponent is choosing any one of the strategies 1 ,..., n w w , then the following must be true for every strategy y of player i:
where [ ] y denotes the event that − that is, the set of states where − player i chooses y), player i continues to consider it possible that his opponent is choosing any one of the strategies 1 ,..., n w w and no other strategies. IND be viewed as a necessary condition for rational beliefs? It seems that, in general, the answer should be negative, for the following reasons.
1. Bicchieri and Green (1999) point out a scenario (an agentive analogue of the EinsteinPodolsky-Rosen phenomenon in quantum mechanics) where causal independence is compatible with correlation and thus it would be possible for a player to coherently believe (a) that her choice is causally independent of the opponent's choice and also (b) that there is correlation between her choice and the opponent's choice, such as the correlation expressed in COR 2 . A belief of this nature could perhaps be judged to be farfetched or implausible (similarly, perhaps, to the beliefs discussed in the Introduction), but not necessarily irrational.
2. In a series of contributions, Spohn (2003 Spohn ( , 2007 Spohn ( , 2010 Spohn ( , 2012 put forward a new solution concept, which he calls "dependency equilibrium", which allows for correlation between the players' choices. An example of a dependency equilibrium is (C,c) (that is, cooperation) in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Spohn stresses the fact that the notion of dependency equilibrium is consistent with the causal independence of the players' actions:
"The point then is to conceive the decision situations of the players as somehow jointly caused and as entangled in a dependency equilibrium… [B] y no means are the players assumed to believe in a causal loop between their actions; rather, they are assumed to believe in the possible entanglement as providing a common cause of their actions." (Spohn, 2007, p. 787.) 3. When it comes to judging a player's beliefs about the strategies of her opponents, it is a widely held opinion that it can be fully rational for, say, Player 3 to believe − in a simultaneous game − (a) that the choices of Player 1 and Player 2 are causally independent and yet (b) that "if Player 1 plays x then Player 2 will play x and if Player 1 plays y then Player 2 will play y". For example, Aumann (1987, p. 16) writes:
"In a game with more than two players, correlation may express the fact that what 3, say, thinks that 1 will do may depend on what he thinks 2 will do. This has no connection with any overt or even covert collusion between 1 and 2; they may be acting entirely independently. Thus it may be common knowledge that both 1 and 2 went to business school, or perhaps to the same business school; but 3 may not know what is taught there. In that case 3 would think it quite likely that they would take similar actions, without being able to guess what those actions might be."
Similarly, Brandenburger and Friedenberg (2008, p. 32) write that this correlation in the mind of Player 3 between the action of Player 1 and the action of Player 2 "is really just an adaptation to game theory of the usual idea of common-cause correlation."
Thus Player 1's beliefs expressed in COR 2 might be criticized for being implausible or hard to justify, but not necessarily irrational.
Subjective counterfactuals as beliefs about causality
The usual argument in support of the thesis that, for the Prisoner's Dilemma game shown in Figure 1 , Player 1's reasoning expressed in COR 1 is fallacious is that even if (e.g. because of symmetry or because of the "identicality" assumption) one agrees that the outcome must be one of the two on the diagonal ( 1 4 and z z ), the off-diagonal outcomes ( 2 3 and z z ) are nevertheless causally possible. Thus one must distinguish between causal (or objective) possibility and doxastic (or subjective) possibility and in the process of rational decision making one has to consider the relevant causal possibilities, even if they are ruled out as doxastically impossible. This is where objective counterfactuals become relevant. This line of reasoning is at the core of causal decision theory.
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According to this point of view, subjective counterfactuals should be interpreted in terms of the composition of a belief relation i B with an objective counterfactual selection function
is the set of states in E that − according to player i's beliefs at state ω − would be "causally true" if E were the case.
It is worth repeating that − from the point of view of judging the rationality of a choice − what matters is not the "true" causal effect of that choice but what the agent believes to be the causal effect of her choice, as illustrated in the example of Section 2 concerning the mislabeled faucets. As another example, consider the case of a player who believes to be engaged − as Player 1 − in a Prisoner's Dilemma game, while in fact Player 2 is a computer that will be informed of Player 1's choice and has been programmed to mirror that choice. In this case, in terms of objective counterfactuals, there is perfect correlation between the choices of the two players, so that the best choice of Player 1 would be to play C. However, Player 1 may rationally play D if she believes that (1) Player 2 will play d and (2) if she were to play C then Player 2 would still play d. Since a player may hold erroneous beliefs about the causal effects of her own choices, it is not clear whether there is a relevant conceptual difference between the "objective" approach discussed in this section and the subjective approach discussed in Section 3.1.
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Causal independence, at a state ω, between the choice of player i and the choices of her opponents would be expressed by the following restriction on the objective selection function
[given a state ω and a player i we denote by ( ) For every strategy y of player i and for every ( )
It is straightforward to check that condition 
Rationality of choice: discussion of the literature
We are yet to provide a precise definition of rationality in strategic-form games. With the few exceptions described below, there has been no formal discussion of the role of counterfactuals in the analysis of strategic-form games. Aumann (1987) The only attempts (that I am aware of) to bring the relevant counterfactuals to the surface are Shin (1992) , Bicchieri and Green (1999) , Zambrano (2004) and Board (2006) . Shin (1992) develops a framework which is very similar to one based on subjective selection functions (as described in Section 3.1). For each player i in a strategic-form game Shin defines a "subjective state space" i Ω . A point in this space specifies a belief of player i about his own choice and the choices of the other players. Such belief assigns probability 1 to player i's own choice (that is, player i is assumed to know his own choice). Shin then defines a metric on this space as follows. Let ω be a state where player i attaches probability 1 to his own choice, call it A, and has beliefs represented by a probability distribution P on the strategies of his where player i attaches probability 1 to B and has the same probability distribution P over the strategies of his opponents that he has at ω . This metric allows player i to evaluate the counterfactual "if I chose B then my payoff would be x". Thus Shin imposes as an axiom the requirement that player i should hold the same beliefs about the other players' choices when contemplating a "deviation" from his actual choice. This assumption corresponds to requirement 1 IND . Not surprisingly, his main result is that a player is rational with respect to this metric if and only if she is Aumann-rational. Zambrano's (2004) approach is a mixture of objective and subjective counterfactuals.
His analysis is restricted to two-player strategic-form games. First of all, he defines a "subjective" selection function for player i, : 
. that arise at the closest state to ω in which i s is actually chosen, that is, with respect to beliefs at ( , )
." (Zambrano, 2004, p. 6 ).
Expressed in terms of our qualitative approach, player i is W-rational at state ω if there is no
Note that, unlike Aumann-rationality (Definition 2), the quantification is over ( ( , ))
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The definition of W-rationality thus disregards the beliefs of player i at state ω and focuses instead on the beliefs that player i would have if she changed her strategy.
Since, in general, those hypothetical beliefs can be different from the initial beliefs at state ω, Zambrano's definition is as follows: player i is W-rational at state ω if there is no strategy i s of player i such that
Let the selection function of Player 1 be given by
Consider state α where the play is (B,D) and both players get a payoff of 0. Player 1 is W-rational at state α (where she chooses B and believes that Player 2 chooses D)
because if she were to play A (state β) then she would believe that Player 2 played C and − given these beliefs − playing B is better than playing A. However, Player 1 is not Aumann-rational at state α, because the notion of Aumann rationality uses the beliefs of Player 1 at state α to compare A to B (while the notion of W-rationality uses the beliefs at state β).
Zambrano then shows (indirectly, through the implications of common knowledge of rationality)
that W-rationality coincides with Aumann-rationality if one adds the following restriction to the subjective selection function Thus the strategy profiles of the opponents that player i would consider possible at state ω, if she were to play a strategy ( ) 
ω ω′ as "ω′ is causally possible relative to ω " in the sense that "everything that occurs at ω′ is consistent with the laws of nature that hold at ω" (p. 180). After discussing at length the difference between doxastic possibility (represented by the relations i B , i N ∈ ) and causal possibility (in the spirit of causal decision theory), they raise the question whether it is possible to construe a situation in which it is causally necessary that the choices of the two players in the Prisoner's Dilemma are the same, while their actions are nonetheless causally independent. They suggest that the answer is positive: one could construct an agentive analogue of the EinsteinPodolsky-Rosen phenomenon in quantum mechanics (p. 184). They conclude that there may indeed be a coherent nomic interpretation of the Identicality assumption, but such interpretation may be controversial. 18 Board presents this as an objective condition on the selection function (if
) assumed to hold at every state but then acknowledges (p. 12) that "it is players' beliefs in causal independence rather than causal independence itself that drives the result."
In the next section we re-examine the commonly held view that counterfactuals ought to be considered inherent to decision-making and rationality. Shackle (1958, p. 21) remarks that if an agent could predict the option he will choose, his decision problem would be "empty", Ginet (1962, p. 50) claims that "it is conceptually impossible for a person to know what a decision of his is going to be before he makes it", Goldman (1970, p. 194) writes that "deliberation implies some doubt as to whether the act will be done", Levi states that "the deliberating agent cannot, before choice, predict how he will choose" (Levi, 1986, p. 65) and coins the phrase "deliberation crowds out prediction" (Levi,1997, p. 81) , Spohn (2012, p. 109) writes that "the decision model must not impute to the agent any cognitive or doxastic assessment of his own actions". "call attention to the possibility that the antecedent is (or will be) false, where one reason one might have for calling attention to the possibility that the antecedent is (or will be) false is that it is quite likely that it is (or will be) false." (DeRose, 2010, p. 10 .)
Conditionals of deliberation and pre-choice beliefs
The indicative conditional signals that the decision whether to leave the office at 4 pm is still "open", while the subjunctive conditional intimates that the speaker is somehow ruling out that option: for example, he has made a tentative or firm decision not to leave at 4 pm.
Thus it would be desirable to model a player's deliberation (or pre-choice) stage beliefs, where the player considers the consequences of all her actions, without predicting her subsequent decision. If a state encodes the player's actual choice, then that choice can be judged to be rational or irrational by relating it to the player's pre-choice beliefs. Hence, according to this approach, it becomes possible for a player to have the same beliefs in two different states, ω and ω′ , and be labeled as rational at state ω and irrational at state ω′ , because the action she ends up taking at state ω is optimal given those beliefs, while the action she ends up taking at state ω′ is not optimal given those same beliefs.
A potential objection to this view arises in dynamic games where a player chooses more than once along a given play of the game. Consider a situation where at time 1 t player i faces a choice and knows that she might be called upon to make a second choice at a later time 2 t . The view outlined above requires player i to have "open" beliefs about her choice at time 1 t but also allows her to have beliefs about (or be certain of) what choice she will make at the later time 2 t .
Is this problematic? Several authors have maintained that there is no inconsistency between the principle that one should not attribute to a player beliefs about her current choice and the claim that, on the other hand, one can attribute to the player beliefs about her later choices. For example, Gilboa writes:
" [W] e are generally happier with a model in which one cannot be said to have beliefs about (let alone knowledge of) one's own choice while making this choice .
[O]ne may legitimately ask: Can you truly claim you have no beliefs about your own future choices? Can you honestly contend you do not believe -or even know -that you will not choose to jump out of the window? [T] he answer to these questions is probably a resounding "No". But the emphasis should be on timing: when one considers one's choice tomorrow, one may indeed be quite sure that one will not decide to jump out of the window. However, a future decision should actually be viewed as a decision by a different "agent" of the same decision maker. [...] It is only at the time of choice, within an "atom of decision", that we wish to preclude beliefs about it." ( Gilboa,1999, pp. 171 -172) In a similar vein, Levi (1997 , p. 81) writes that "agent X may coherently assign unconditional credal probabilities to hypotheses as to what he will do when some future opportunity for choice arises. Such probability judgments can have no meaningful role, however, when the opportunity of choice becomes the current one." Similarly, Spohn (1977, p. 114) states the principle that "any adequate quantitative decision model must not explicitly or implicitly contain any subjective probabilities for acts" and then adds (Spohn, 1999, pp. 44 -45 ) that in the case of sequential decision making, the decision maker can ascribe subjective probabilities to his future (but not to his present) actions. We share the point of view expressed by these authors. If a player moves sequentially at times 1 t and 2 t , with 1 2 t t < , then at time 1 t she has full control over her immediate choices (those available at 1 t ) but not over her later choices (those available at 2 t ). The agent can predict -or form an intention about -her future behavior, but she cannot irrevocably decide it, just as she can predict -but not decide -how other individuals will behave after her current choice.
Doxastic models of games incorporating deliberation-stage beliefs were recently introduced in Bonanno (2013b Bonanno ( , 2013c for the analysis of dynamic games. Space limitations prevent us from going into the details of these models.
